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The Impact of Information Dissemination
on Vaccination in Multiplex Networks
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Research Center of Smart Networks and Systems, School of Information Science and Engineering
Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China.
The impact of information dissemination on epidemic control is essentially subject to individual
behaviors. Unlike information-driven behaviors, vaccination is determined by many cost-related
factors, whose correlation with the information dissemination should be better understood. To this
end, we propose an evolutionary vaccination game model in multiplex networks by integrating an
information-epidemic spreading process into the vaccination dynamics, and explore how informa-
tion dissemination influences vaccination. The spreading process is described by a two-layer coupled
susceptible-alert-infected-susceptible (SAIS) model, where the strength coefficient between two lay-
ers is defined to characterize the tendency and intensity of information dissemination. We find that
information dissemination can increase the epidemic threshold, however, more information trans-
mission cannot promote vaccination. Specifically, increasing information dissemination even leads
to a decline of the vaccination equilibrium and raises the final infection density. Moreover, we study
the impact of strength coefficient and individual sensitivity on social cost, and unveil the role of
information dissemination in controlling the epidemic with numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
The epidemic control has been studied many decades
[1–4], since the outbreak and propagation of virus may
cause tremendous damage and bring huge (economic)
losses. Various models, such as the susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model [5, 6] and the susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) model [7], have been used to de-
scribe epidemic spreading processes. The understanding
of disease-behavior dynamics motivates more and more
efforts to explore the epidemic dynamics beyond such
models [8–10]. Individual behaviors, such as wearing
masks and washing hands, which may reduce the sus-
ceptibility to infection, can be triggered by the aware-
ness (information) diffusion. Funk et al. [11] studied how
awareness impacts the virus propagation in a well-mixed
population, finding that the awareness diffusion can re-
duce the outbreak range, but cannot affect the epidemic
threshold. Similarly, Wu et al. [12] explored the impact of
three different kinds of awareness on the epidemic spread
in a scale-free networked population. However, single-
layer networks provide a limited representation of com-
plex systems [13]. The efforts in [11, 12] may fail to
involve the realistic scenario where the information and
virus spread via different networks simultaneously.
Recently, multiplex networks representing social inter-
actions at different contexts, e.g. individuals transmit
information through an online social network, and at
the same time an epidemic propagates among the indi-
viduals on a physical contact network, have been stud-
ied in [14–18]. The interactions between layers (net-
works) may yield the outcomes beyond what isolated
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layers can capture [19]. Granell et al. [20] proposed
an unaware-aware-unaware (UAU) susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) dynamics in a multiplex network, which
is composed of a virtual contact network and a physi-
cal contact network, to investigate the interplay between
the spreading of awareness and epidemic. Different from
the assumption that both the awareness and epidemic
spreading processes have the same dynamics in [20], Guo
et al. [21] introduced a threshold model to describe the
awareness cascading phenomenon of human awareness.
However, they both assumed that the aware individuals
are completely immune to infection, that is, each indi-
vidual chooses vaccination in response to information. In
reality, behavioral adoption or response, especially vacci-
nation, is a complex process [22–24]. On the one hand,
vaccination is regarded as one of the most effective and
protective behaviors (strategies) against virus propaga-
tion [25–27]. On the other hand, vaccination usually
comes with some cost, and the decision of an individ-
ual on vaccination depends on not only his trade-off to
the cost, but also the strategies of other individuals. Vac-
cination presents a social dilemma since a self-interested
individual expects to get benefit from the vaccinating
behavior of others [28–31]. Therefore, understanding the
relation between information dissemination and vaccina-
tion behavior is critical to epidemic control.
In this study, we construct an evolutionary vaccina-
tion game in a multiplex network which is composed of
an information layer and a contact layer, and explore
the role of information dissemination on vaccination. In
order to reflect the reactions of individuals to risk infor-
mation, we introduce an alert state (A) with information
attributes into the SIS model, and propose a two-layer
coupled SAIS model to describe the spreading process.
We assume that the alert individuals are less likely to be
2infected than the susceptible individuals. We find that
different behavioral responses to information have differ-
ent impacts on epidemic spread. Moreover, we study the
factors to affect vaccination equilibrium and social cost
with numerical simulations.
The rest of this paper comes as follows. Section II for-
mulates the problem of this paper. Section III presents a
two-layer coupled SAIS model, where we analyse the epi-
demic dynamics theoretically and numerically. In section
IV, we introduce an evolutionary vaccination game in a
multiplex network. Section V presents the vaccination
performance against epidemic propagation and the role
of information. Section VI concludes the whole paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Vaccination is an effective and preventive strategy
against epidemic propagation. When information and
epidemic spread simultaneously, those susceptible indi-
viduals may get to know the epidemic status by receiv-
ing risk information from their infected neighbors. The
qualitative analysis on the impact of information dissem-
ination on vaccination cannot reach a unified conclusion.
Consequently, Xia and Liu [27] proposed a belief-based
model to study the impact factors of individual vaccina-
tion decisions. However, the costs of individuals related
to the social cost were not taken into account. Note that
it is generally assumed that individuals are self-interested
to minimize their own costs instead of the social cost,
which is one of the most important optimization sub-
jects in epidemic control. An individual’s vaccination
decision depends on not only his trade-off on the cost
but also the strategies of other individuals, since vaccina-
tion contributes to herd immunity, protecting individuals
without vaccination from being infected. The correlation
between information dissemination and vaccination de-
termines the vaccination density that affects the social
cost. Therefore, in this study, we propose an evolutionary
vaccination game by integrating an information-epidemic
spreading process into the process of strategic selection
and interaction, and explore how information dissemi-
nation influences vaccination. Moreover, we show the
social cost and infection density as a function of vaccina-
tion density to explore the role of vaccination in epidemic
control, and study the impact of strength coefficient and
individual sensitivity on the vaccination equilibrium with
numerical simulations.
In order to study the impact of information dissemi-
nation on vaccination, we assume that the vaccinated in-
dividuals are fully protected, regardless of the influence
of vaccine efficiency [32, 33]. Taking into account the
regularity of seasonal diseases and effectiveness of vac-
cination, we assume that individuals who are prone to
immunization will be vaccinated before the outbreak of
disease. The evolutionary vaccination game model (as
illustrated in Fig. 1) includes two stages: the decision-
making stage (stage 1) and the spreading stage (stage
2). During stage 2 (epidemic season) the epidemic and
information (of the epidemic status) propagate simulta-
neously at the corresponding layer. Each node (individ-
ual) unilaterally decides whether to get vaccinated during
stage 1, which is modeled by a vaccination game that oc-
curs before the start of stage 2. A vaccinated individual
will not be infected and no longer gets involved in the
next epidemic season, while the unvaccinated individuals
have a risk of being infected. When the epidemic pro-
cess reaches a steady state, each individual will adjust
his decision-making with respect to vaccination for the
next epidemic season.
FIG. 1. A schematic stage illustration of the evolutionary
vaccination game model in a multiplex network. This net-
work includes two layers, the information layer corresponds
to a network where risk information spreads, and the epi-
demic propagates on the contact layer. Individuals labeled
by V choose to be vaccinated at stage 1. At stage 2, the
vaccinated individuals are no longer involved in the epidemi-
ological process which is described by the two-layer coupled
SAIS model, while the unvaccinated individuals are at risk of
being infected.
III. THE SAIS SEASONAL EPIDEMICS
WITHOUT VACCINATION
A two-layer multiplex network with different network
topologies are illustrated in Fig. 1. The information layer
and contact layer have the same number of nodes, and
the size is N . Each node (individual) in one layer has
its counterpart node in another layer. There are three
possible states for each node, susceptible (S), alert (A)
or infected (I). In the information layer, a susceptible
node can perceive the risk information of virus from its
infected neighbors, and convert to an alert node. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that an alert node may
ignore or not care about this risk information, and be-
comes a susceptible node with rate η. In the contact
layer, an infected node infects its susceptible and alert
neighbours with infection rates β and βA, respectively,
where βA = ξβ. Taking into account the complexity of
individual decision-making behaviour in reality, we as-
sume that the alert state is different from the immune
state, which means 0 < ξ ≤ 1. Each infected node recov-
ers with rate µ.
3FIG. 2. Transition probability diagrams for susceptible (S), alert (A) and infected (I) states of the coupled SAIS propagation
dynamics. Both susceptible and alert nodes can be infected by their infected neighbors, and the difference is that the alert nodes
have been informed. qSi denotes the transition probability for susceptible individual i not being infected by the neighbours,
qAi denotes the transition probability for alert individual i not being infected by the neighbours, θi denotes the transition
probability for susceptible individual i being informed by the infected neighbours, µ denotes the transition probability from the
infected to the susceptible states, η denotes the transition probability from the alert to the susceptible states, and α denotes
the strength factor.
Let pSi (t), p
A
i (t) and p
I
i (t) denote the probabilities for
node i of being susceptible, alert and infected at time
t, respectively. We assume that each node has the same
sensitivity λ to the risk information. For susceptible node
i with degree ki, the probability of being an alert node is
denoted by θi =
λ
ki
∑N
j=1 ajip
I
j , where aji is the element
of adjacency matrix A of the information layer, and aji =
1 if there is a link between nodes i and j. We denote the
transition probability for node i not being infected by the
neighbours as qSi (t) if i is a susceptible node, or as q
A
i (t)
if i is an alert node. The element of adjacency matrix B
of the contact layer is denoted by bji, and we have
{
qAi (t) =
∏N
j=1(1 − bjip
I
j (t)βA)
qSi (t) =
∏N
j=1(1 − bjip
I
j (t)β).
(1)
We define the strength coefficient α as the tendency
and intensity of information dissemination. The tran-
sition probability diagrams for three states of the cou-
pled SAIS propagation dynamics are illustrated in Fig.
2. For instance, the probability that susceptible node
i remains susceptible at each time step is denoted by
αqSi + (1− α)(1− θi). Specifically, α = 1 corresponds to
the case in a single-layer network, i.e., only the epidemic
propagates in the contact layer. The information and
epidemic spreading processes coexist when 0 < α < 1.
The continuous time Markov approach can provide an
exact description of the actual epidemic spreading, how-
ever, the infinitesimal generator Q2N×2N [34] is difficult
to obtain, especially for large scale networks [35], since
the Markov chain contains 2N states. Therefore, we uti-
lize the microscopic Markov chain approach [20] to ex-
plore the probability evolution of different states for node
i as below:


pSi (t+ 1) = [αq
S
i (t) + (1− θi(t))(1 − α)]p
S
i (t) + µp
I
i (t)
+ η(1− α)pAi (t)
pAi (t+ 1) = [αq
A
i (t) + (1− η)(1 − α)]p
A
i (t)
+ (1− α)θi(t)p
S
i (t)
pIi (t+ 1) = α(1 − q
S
i (t))p
S
i (t) + α(1 − q
A
i (t))p
A
i (t)
+ (1− µ)pIi (t).
(2)
When pIi (t+ 1) = p
I
i (t) = p
I
i , we have

pSi =
(1−pIi )[α(1−q
A
i )+η(1−α)]
α(1−qAi )+(1−α)(η+θi)
pAi =
(1−α)θi(1−p
I
i )
α(1−qAi )+(1−α)(η+θi)
µ
α
pIi = (1− q
S
i )p
S
i + (1− q
A
i )p
A
i .
(3)
Let βA = ξβ, combining Eq. (3) with p
S
i + p
A
i + p
I
i =
1, we obtain the infection probability of node i in the
stationary state,
pIi =
M + αη(1 − α)(1 − qSi )
M + αµ(1 − qAi ) + (1− α)[µ(η + θi) + αη(1 − q
S
i )]
,
(4)
where M = α(1 − qAi )[(1 − α)θi + α(1 − q
S
i )]. Thus, the
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FIG. 3. The comparison of infection density ρI obtained by
the SAIS model and Monte Carlo simulations as a function
of infection rate β in (a) two-layer ER networks and (b) two-
layer BA scale-free networks with exponent 3, respectively.
The Monte Carlo simulations is averaged by 30 realizations.
µ = 0.6, η = 0.1, ξ = 0.5.
infection density ρI can be computed as
ρI =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pIi . (5)
We compare ρI obtained by Eq. (5) with the one ob-
tained by Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to evaluate the
analytical result. Simulations are performed in two-layer
ER networks and two-layer BA scale-free networks, where
the network size (each layer with the same size) and
strength coefficient are taken into account to illustrate
the applicability of the model. In a multiplex network
with two layers, the topology of each layer is different.
For instance, the contact layer of a two-layer BA scale-
free network has a power-law degree distribution with ex-
ponent 3, and the information layer is the same network
with some extra random links. Fig. 3 shows that the in-
fection density ρI increases with the increase of infection
rate β. When β > βc, the so-called epidemic threshold,
the epidemic outbreaks and infection density ρI > 0.
When β → βc, the probability satisfies 0 ≤ p
I
i ≪ 1,
Eq. (2) can be further simplified as
{
qAi (t) = 1− ξβ
∑N
j=1 bjip
I
j (t)
qSi (t) = 1− β
∑N
j=1 bjip
I
j (t).
(6)
Let φi = p
I
i , combining Eq. (3) with Eq. (6) and
omitting the second-order terms of φ, we obtain
µ
αβ
φi = (1 − (1− ξ)p
A
i )
N∑
j=1
bjiφj . (7)
Considering that θi is proportional to the sum of p
I
j ,
we obtain 0 ≤ pAi ≪ 1. Then, Eq. (7) can be reduced to
N∑
j=1
[bji −
µ
αβ
ǫji]φj = 0, (8)
where ǫji is the element of the identify matrix. Eq. (8)
has non-trivial solutions if and only if µ
αβ
is the eigenvalue
of adjacency matrix B. Therefore, we obtain the epidemic
threshold
βc =
µ
α∆max(B)
, (9)
where ∆max(B) is the largest eigenvalue of matrix B. Ob-
viously, the epidemic threshold βc depends on the struc-
ture of contact layer B and the strength coefficient α.
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FIG. 4. Epidemic threshold βc as a function of strength coef-
ficient α in (a) a two-layer ER network with N = 100 in each
layer and (b) a two-layer BA scale-free network with N = 500
in each layer, respectively. µ = 0.45, η = 0.1, ξ = 0.5.
Fig. 4 illustrates the impacts of strength coefficient
α on epidemic threshold βc. We find that the epidemic
threshold decreases with the increase of α, regardless of
the network topology. Moreover, the epidemic threshold
calculated by Eq. (9) is in agreement with the one ob-
tained by the MC simulations in a two-layer ER network
and a two-layer BA scale-free network, respectively. In
terms of the infection density and epidemic threshold,
we conclude that there is a good agreement between the
MMCA method and Monte Carlo simulations no matter
what network sizes and strength coefficients are.
Besides, network size N also influences infection den-
sity ρI and epidemic threshold βc. Fig. 5 shows that
the epidemic threshold βc decreases with the increase of
network size N . In terms of the infection density ρI , it
depends on not only the network size N but also the in-
fection rate β. Meanwhile, different network structures
display different results. For a two-layer ER network (see
Fig. 5 (a)), when the network size and the infection rate
exceed a certain value (N > 35, β > 0.6), both network
size N and infection rate β will no longer affect the infec-
tion density ρI . For a two-layer BA scale-free network,
network size N affects the infection density ρI only when
infection rate β < 0.4. When β ≥ 0.4, the infection
density ρI only depends on β.
In order to reveal the role of behavioral response of the
alert individuals, we investigate the impact of coefficient
ξ on the propagation dynamics. As illustrated in Fig.
5 (c), ξ does not affect the epidemic threshold βc, but
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FIG. 5. Infection density ρI as a function of infection rate β in multiplex networks with different N , where each layer is (a) an
ER network and (b) a BA scale-free network, respectively. The strength coefficient α = 0.5. (c) The impacts of coefficient ξ on
the infection density ρI and epidemic threshold βc.
affects the infection density ρI . Moreover, we find that
the impact of ξ on the epidemic threshold βc is various
in different ranges of ξ. When ξ > 0.3, the changes of
ξ will have no effect on the epidemic threshold βc. The
infection density is greatly reduced when ξ → 0, where
all the alert individuals are immune to the infection, as
the assumption in [20]. However, individuals with risk
information do not necessarily choose vaccination in re-
ality.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY VACCINATION GAME
For a network with two layers, although different lay-
ers represent social interactions at different contexts, the
strategic choices of an individual in one layer may af-
fect that in the other layer. For simplicity, we assume
that each node and its counterpart node have the same
strategy during the same round.
The decision of an individual may be affected by many
factors due to the infection interactions. We consider
that there exists a communication cost T due to the risk
information diffuses in the information layer. In order to
promote vaccination, we assume that unvaccinated indi-
viduals have communication costs while vaccinated ones
do not. An individual choosing vaccination has the vacci-
nation cost C, and vaccination is completely effective so
that a vaccinated individual does not participate in the
information-epidemic process. In addition to the commu-
nication cost, a non-vaccinated individual being infected
has the infection costH . Considering that an individual’s
strategy functions in both layers, we assume that the cost
of an individual is determined by the sumed costs of two
layers. The cost of individual i in a two-layer coupled
network is therefore denoted by
Ui = Cms + [Hvi + (1 − α)T ](1−ms) (10)
where ms = 1 if individual i chooses vaccination, oth-
erwise, ms = 0, and vi = 1 or 0 indicates whether in-
dividual i is infected or not. Without loss of generality,
we assume that cost C of a vaccinated individual is less
than costH . Meanwhile, an unvaccinated individual who
benefits from his vaccinated neighbours may not be in-
fected, resulting in a social dilemma. Hence, we have the
following condition
(1− α)T < C < H + (1− α)T (11)
We define the proportion of individuals who choose
vaccination as vaccination density, denoted by x. The
infection rate becomes (1− x)β during the epidemic sea-
son [36]. The average payoffs of vaccinated individuals
Pv and unvaccinated individuals Puv are as follows,{
Pv = −C
Puv = −[f(x)(H + (1− α)T ) + (1− f(x))(1 − α)T ],
(12)
where f(x) = ρ
I (x)
1−x is the ratio of the number of infected
individuals to that of unvaccinated individuals. The in-
fection density
ρI(x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pIi (x), (13)
where pIi (x) is the infection probability for node i in the
stationary state, which can be obtained in section III.
The social cost of a multiplex network with N nodes is
Esc = N [xC + [(H + (1 − α)T )f(x)
+ (1− α)(1 − f(x))T ](1 − x)
= N [(C − (1− α)T )x+ ρI(x) + (1− α)T ].
(14)
The optimal value of vaccination density x to minimize
the social cost is herd immunity threshold xc. We will
discuss the factors which influence the social cost and
herd immunity threshold xc in section V.
We study the vaccination dynamics and predict vacci-
nation behavior of individuals through pairwise interac-
tions in a two-layer coupled network. Once the spreading
process in this season ends, each individual updates his
strategy for the next epidemic season. We adopt the
Fermi rule [37] for the strategy updating. At each round,
6individual i randomly selects a neighbour j in the infor-
mation layer, compares their costs, and learns the strat-
egy of individual j with the following probability:
w(Si←Sj) =
1
1 + exp[−k(Uj−Ui)]
, (15)
where Si and Sj correspond to the strategies of indi-
viduals i and j, respectively. Parameter k represents the
selection intensity, measuring how much the selection de-
pends on the cost difference.
In homogeneous networks, we approximate the evo-
lutionary dynamics with the replicator dynamics [38],
which is presented as x˙ = x(Pv − P¯ ), where P¯ =
xPv + (1− x)Puv is the average payoff. Therefore,
dx
dt = x(Pv − P¯ )
= x(1 − x)[Hf(x) + (1− α)T − C],
(16)
where vaccination cost C ∈ [0, 1). For simplicity, let
H = 1, Eq. (16) can be simplified as
dx
dt = x(1 − x)[f(x) − C + (1− α)T ]. (17)
The equilibria of Eq. (17) are given by x = 0, x = 1,
or interior equilibrium xˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
f(xˆ)− C + (1− α)T = 0. (18)
Note that f(x) decreases with the increase of x, until
x reaches the herd immunity threshold xc. If
C
T
> 1 −
α, when x ∈ (0, xˆ), we have f(x) − C + (1 − α)T >
0, similarly, when x ∈ (xˆ, 1), we have f(x) − C + (1 −
α)T < 0. Based on the equilibrium stability criterion
[39], we conclude that the interior equilibrium xˆ is stable,
given the equation f(xˆ) = C − (1−α)T is satisfied. The
equilibrium x = 0 is stable, if C > ρI(0) and f(x)−C +
(1−α)T < 0, when x = 0 and f(0) = ρI(0). That is, in a
homogeneous multiplex network, the costs of vaccination
and communication are C and T , where C, T ∈ [0, 1),
respectively. The stable vaccination equilibrium x∗ = xˆ,
satisfying f(x∗) = C−(1−α)T , is an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS), when C
T
> 1−α; the ESS is x∗ = 0, when
C > ρI(0) + (1− α)T .
V. VACCINATION PERFORMANCE AND
ROLE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION
In order to study the vaccination performance in epi-
demic control, we consider that a proportion x of individ-
uals choose to be vaccinated in a two-layer ER network,
and explore the impacts of vaccination on the infection
density and social cost. Fig. 6 shows the social cost
Esc and infection density ρ
I as a function of vaccina-
tion density x, respectively. There exists a herd immu-
nity threshold xc that results in the minimal social cost,
which is consistent with the case of a single-layer network
[25]. When x < xc, both infection density ρ
I and social
FIG. 6. Social cost (a) and infection density (c) as a function
of vaccination density x with different strength coefficients
α. Social cost (b) and infection density (d) as a function of
vaccination density x with different infection rates β. N =
500, µ = 0.4, C = 0.4, T = 0.1 and ξ = 0.5.
cost Esc decrease with the increase of vaccination density
x. It is worth noting that the herd immunity threshold
xc is not affected by the strength coefficient α, but in-
creases as the infection rate β increases. Moreover, we
find that the strength coefficient α has an influence on
the social cost Esc and infection density ρ
I . As shown
in Fig. 6 (a), since the vaccination density x increases,
the difference between the social costs Esc caused by dif-
ferent strength coefficients decreases. In summary, for a
fixed vaccination density x, which is less than the herd
immunity threshold xc, more information may result in
less social cost Esc and infection density ρ
I .
We now perform simulations on a two-layer ER net-
work (N = 500) to study the vaccination dynamics. The
initial factions of vaccinated and infected individuals are
set to 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. For a fixed communica-
tion cost T = 0.1, Fig. 7 (a) shows that the vaccination
equilibrium x∗ as a function of vaccination cost C un-
der the influence of information dissemination (α = 0.6).
The solid line is calculated by Eq. (18). We find that
there is a good agreement between the analytical solu-
tions and numerical simulations, and vaccination equilib-
rium x∗ decreases with the increase of vaccination cost
C. The introduced vaccination affects the epidemic prop-
agation. Let ρ∗ denote the final infection density at the
equilibrium. Figs. 7 (b) and 7 (c) illustrate that as the
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FIG. 7. (a) The relationship between the vaccination equilibrium x∗ and vaccination cost C. The solid line is numerically
determined by Eq. (18). The final infection density ρ∗ as a function of the vaccination equilibrium x∗ in a two-layer ER
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infection density ρ∗. µ = 0.4, β = 0.8, T = 0.1 and ξ = 0.5.
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FIG. 8. For different strength coefficients, (a) vaccination equilibrium x∗, (b) final infection density ρ∗ and (c) social cost E∗sc
as a function of vaccination cost C in a two-layer ER network. µ = 0.4, β = 0.8, T = 0.1 and ξ = 0.5.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
C
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
∗
α=0.6
α=0.8
BA, N=500, λ=0.2, k=20
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
C
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
ρ
∗
α=0.6
α=0.8
BA, N=500, λ=0.2, k=20
(b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
C
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
E
∗ s
c
α=0.6
α=0.8
BA, N=500, λ=0.2, k=20
(c)
FIG. 9. For different strength coefficients, (a) vaccination equilibrium x∗, (b) final infection density ρ∗ and (c) social cost E∗sc
as a function of vaccination cost C in a two-layer BA scale-free network. µ = 0.4, β = 0.8, T = 0.1 and ξ = 0.5.
vaccination equilibrium x∗ increases, the final infection
density ρ∗ decreases regardless of the network structure.
In addition, the social cost at the equilibrium, denoted by
E∗sc, decreases with the decreases of final infection den-
sity ρ∗, as shown in the insets. Therefore, we conclude
that the increase of vaccination equilibrium x∗ can effec-
tively reduce the final infection density ρ∗ and social cost
E∗sc, and help to control the spread of epidemics.
How to improve the vaccination equilibrium motivates
us to explore the impact factors of vaccination. For a
fixed vaccination cost C, we compare the vaccination
equilibrium x∗ with different strength coefficients to de-
termine the effect of information dissemination intensity
on the vaccination decision-making. Simulations are per-
formed in a two-layer ER network and a two-layer BA
scale-free network, respectively. As illustrated in Figs. 8
(a) and 9 (a), vaccination equilibrium x∗ = 0, when the
vaccination cost is relatively large (C > 0.7), the change
8of strength coefficient α has no effect on x∗. However, the
vaccination equilibrium x∗ decreases with the decrease of
strength coefficient α, when C ∈ (0.5, 0.7) in Fig. 8 (a)
and C ∈ (0.2, 0.7) in Fig. 9 (a). In other words, the in-
crease of the intensity of information transmission leads
to a decline of the vaccination equilibrium x∗, when the
vaccination cost C is within a certain range (of which up-
per bound depends on the network topology and lower
bound is ρI(0) + (1− α)T ).
Figs. 8 (b) and 9 (b) show that with the increase
of vaccination cost C, the final infection density ρ∗ in-
creases. Similar to the procedure of x∗, we study how
the strength coefficient α influences the final infection
density ρ∗ with a given C. We find that when the vacci-
nation cost C is relatively small, the change of strength
coefficient α has no effect on the final infection density
ρ∗ as well. The final infection density ρ∗ under α = 0.6
is higher than the one under α = 0.8, when the vac-
cination cost C is within a certain range. Associating
the final infection density ρ∗ with the vaccination equi-
librium x∗, we find that the final infection density ρ∗
increases when the information dissemination suppresses
vaccination. When the vaccination cost C is relatively
large, vaccination equilibrium x∗ = 0, the opposite is
true and the information dissemination can reduce the
final infection density. In summary, although informa-
tion transmission can trigger some protective behaviors,
e.g., wearing masks and washing hands, to reduce the ef-
fective infectivity at that season, the resulting reduction
of vaccination density may lead to the increase of infec-
tion density at the next epidemic season. In terms of the
social cost E∗sc, only when the vaccination cost exceeds a
certain value (C > 0.7), the change of strength coefficient
has an impact on the social cost (see Figs. 8 (c) and 9
(c)). As the strength coefficient increases, the social cost
increases. In general, the effect of information dissemi-
nation on vaccination and epidemic control depends on
the vaccination cost.
We further explore the effect of sensitivity coefficient
λ on vaccination. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that each individual has the same sensitivity λ to the in-
formation. We perform simulations on a two-layer BA
scale-free network (N = 1000) and a two-layer ER net-
work (N = 500), respectively. As illustrated in Figs.
10 (a) and 10 (b), the vaccination equilibrium x∗ de-
creases with the increase of sensitivity coefficient λ when
C ∈ (0.2, 0.65), indicating that information transmission
cannot promote vaccination in a two-layer BA scale-free
network. For a two-layer ER network, sensitivity coef-
ficient has no effect on both vaccination equilibrium x∗
and social cost E∗sc. Therefore, we conclude that the role
of individual sensitivity to risk information in immune
decision-making depends on the network topology.
FIG. 10. Vaccination equilibrium x∗ and social cost E∗sc as
a function of vaccination cost C with different sensitivity co-
efficients λ in (a)-(b) a two-layer BA scale-free network with
N = 1000 and (c)-(d) a two-layer ER network with N = 500,
respectively. µ = 0.4, β = 0.8, T = 0.1, k = 20.
VI. CONCLUSION
Individuals behavioral responses to information dis-
semination determine its influence on epidemic control.
Increasing the vaccination equilibrium can reduce the fi-
nal infection density and social cost. Taking into ac-
count the complexity of decision-making of individuals
in vaccination, we have presented an evolutionary vac-
cination game model by incorporating the information-
epidemic propagation process into the vaccination dy-
namics, and explored the influence of information dis-
semination on vaccination. The impact of strength coef-
ficient and individual sensitivity on the vaccination equi-
librium reveals that more information transmission can-
not promote vaccination. Information dissemination is
negatively correlated with vaccination when vaccination
cost C < ρI(0) + (1 − α)T . Although more informa-
tion dissemination at one epidemic season can increase
the epidemic threshold of that stage, it cannot improve
the vaccination equilibrium in the whole multiple epi-
demic seasons. Therefore, during the whole process of
the evolutionary vaccination game in multiple epidemic
seasons, information transmission increases the final in-
fection density. Since information dissemination is in-
evitable during the epidemic, the correlation between in-
formation dissemination and vaccination may provide a
9guidance for the authorities to implement information
regulation for epidemic control. However, the situation
of stochastic fluctuations that lead to the extinction of
infection in finite networks [40] has not been considered
in this paper, which may be of interest in multiplex vac-
cination games in the future.
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